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Potential role of wildlife in the USA in
the event of a foot-and-mouth disease
virus incursion
Vienna R Brown,

1

Sarah N Bevins2

Abstract
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is caused by foot-and-mouth disease virus (FMDV) which affects domestic
and wild cloven-hoofed species. The FMD-free status of the USA and the tremendous economic impact of a
virus incursion motivated the development of this evaluation of the potential role of wildlife in the event of a
virus introduction. Additionally, this manuscript contains a summary of US vulnerabilities for viral incursion
and persistence which focuses specifically on the possible role of wildlife. The legal movement of susceptible
live animals, animal products, by-products and animal feed containing animal products pose a risk of virus
introduction and spread. Additionally, the illegal movement of FMD-susceptible animals and their products and
an act of bioterrorism present additional routes where FMDV could be introduced to the USA. Therefore, robust
surveillance and rapid diagnostics in the face of a possible introduction are essential for detecting and controlling
FMD as quickly as possible. Wildlife species and feral pigs present an added complexity in the case of FMDV
introduction as they are typically not closely monitored or managed and there are significant logistical concerns
pertaining to disease surveillance and control in these populations. Recommendations highlight the need to
address existing knowledge gaps relative to the potential role of wildlife in FMDV introduction events.
Introduction
Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) is caused by foot-andmouth disease virus (FMDV) which infects clovenhoofed animals, including cattle, sheep, goats and pigs,
as well as various wild species.1 The primary routes of
transmission are inhalation of infectious virus, direct
and indirect contact with infected animals and exposure
to contaminated fomites. Clinical disease manifests as
vesicle formation on the tongue, hard palate, dental pad,
lips, gums, muzzle, coronary band, interdigital space
and (in females) on the teats.2–4 These lesions lead to
weight loss, lameness, lethargy and a reduction in milk
yield.5 Additionally, death due to myocardial necrosis
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has been reported in young animals.6 There have been
eight different outbreaks in the USA since the first
reported introduction in 1870, with the last reported
case of FMD occurring in 1929 in California.7 There are
seven immunological serotypes of FMDV, each with a
multitude of topotypes, genetic lineages and strains
enzootic in Africa, Asia and parts of South America.8–11
FMD is considered to be one of the most important
animal diseases in the world because of the significant
financial burden associated with this disease in both
endemic and FMD-free countries.12 Estimates indicate
that FMD costs between US$6.5 and US$21 billion
annually in endemic countries, with the principal costs
attributed to production losses and vaccination and
outbreaks of FMD can cost FMD-free countries more
than US$1.5 billion annually.13 A number of models
approximate the cost associated with an introduction
of FMD into the USA; however, outcomes are variable
as they are dependent on a number of factors,
including species of detection; size of the operation
implicated in the index case; presence or absence of
transmission events to other livestock of the same
species, an alternative species, or wildlife or feral
animals; geographical location within the country; and
rapidity of detection and deployment of disease control
efforts.14–16
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Notably, based on information from the 2001
FMD outbreak in the UK, the total cost may, in fact,
be much larger.17 More than 6,000,000 animals were
depopulated and the direct costs to the public and
private sectors combined are approximated at over
US$10.5 billion. This outbreak was initiated through
the feeding of contaminated, untreated waste to pigs
and was then introduced to sheep on a nearby property
and readily disseminated through the marketing and
movement of sheep.18 19 In 2010, there was an FMD
outbreak in Japan in a densely cattle and pig populated
region and 290,000 animals were depopulated in order
to control the epidemic, resulting in compensation costs
of US$550 million for the value of culled livestock.20
Furthermore, South Korea experienced five outbreaks
of FMD between 2000 and 2011 which resulted in
over US$3.5 billion in economic losses and ultimately
resulted in the loss of FMD-free status.21
FMD is not a zoonotic pathogen but it is a reportable
animal disease to the World Organisation for Animal
Health (OIE) and virus detection can bring about
substantial trade restrictions and tremendous economic
losses. This manuscript provides a brief description of
domestic livestock production within the continental
USA as well as an overview of FMDV-susceptible feral
and wildlife species on the landscape. While our
primary focus is on FMD in wildlife, management
of domestic livestock was included as the livestockwildlife interface is a risk for spillover which would
significantly complicate control strategies in the event
of a virus introduction. A summary of vulnerabilities
for US viral introduction and persistence is provided
and, ultimately, recommendations are made for further
research based on determined gaps in knowledge.

Domestic livestock
Domestic livestock, specifically cattle, sheep, goats and
pigs, are all susceptible to infection with FMDV and their
density and distribution across the USA, in addition to
commonly used management practices, are important
components that would play a role in the event of an
FMDV introduction into the USA. The number of cattle
and calves in the USA is estimated to be 93 million
animals with the beef industry valued at nearly
$68 billion22 and the dairy industry, as measured by farm
gate receipts, was estimated to be valued at $34 billion
in 2016.23 Cattle are found in all 50 states with Texas,
Nebraska, Kansas, California and Oklahoma serving as
the top five states for cattle and calf production in 2015,
accounting for nearly 40 per cent of all production.
Sales of sheep and goats and their products totalled
nearly $705 million in the USA in 2007, according to
the 2007 Census of Agriculture Report, reported by
the National Agriculture Statistics Service.24 The sheep
population in the USA was conservatively estimated to
be 5.2 million head in January 2018 and the majority
of sheep are raised west of the Mississippi River with
2

Texas, California, Colorado, Wyoming and Utah being
the five largest producers of sheep and their products.25
The goat population in the USA was approximated at
3.5 million animals that are used for meat, milk and
fibre purposes based on data obtained from the 2002
agricultural census.26 Texas, Tennessee, California,
Oklahoma and Georgia are the top five goat-producing
states and California has the largest population of dairy
goats in the USA. The estimated population of domestic
pigs in the USA is 65 million, with Iowa, North Carolina,
Minnesota, Illinois and Indiana being the five top porkproducing states annually.27 The 2012 USDA Census of
Agriculture reported the hog and pig industry to have
sales of $22.5 billion.
For ruminants, the majority of meat animals are
managed on pasture or rangeland for the duration
of their lives or until the final stage whence they are
congregated in a feedlot setting for finishing, whereas
dairy animals are typically managed in an open lot
or barn setting to facilitate milk collection. There is
an opportunity for interaction with other domestic
livestock or wildlife in either setting, although the
pasture or range grazed animals would be more likely
to encounter feral or wild species. It is important to
note that outbreaks in animals grazed on pasture or
rangeland would be much more difficult to control,
either via vaccination or depopulation, as compared
with concentrated animals in a drylot or feedlot setting.
The commercial pig industry is managed entirely
indoors with no access to, or interaction with, other
domestic livestock or wildlife; however, backyard pigs
may have ample opportunity to interact with a variety
of domestic and wild species.
Retrospective analyses from the 2001 outbreak
of FMD in Great Britain determined that the spatial
distribution, size and species composition on farms
heavily influenced the observed pattern of disease
spread and regional variability.28 The initial spread
of the outbreak is believed to have been driven by the
movement of sheep, likely partially attributable to
difficulty detecting FMD infection in sheep as compared
with cattle or pigs.29 Several modelling analyses
demonstrated that markets, and other high-density,
high-dissemination facilities, such as dealers and
slaughterhouses, played an instrumental role in viral
spread.29 30 Simulations suggest that the contamination
of markets is crucial for a large epidemic event29 and
not surprisingly, reduced animal mixing was found to
decrease the number of cases, the number of culled
animals, and shorten the overall duration of the
epidemic.28 Also of consequence, cattle were determined
to be a key species in the 2001 FMD outbreak after
initial spread by sheep.31 Resultant from this finding,
Buhnerkempe and colleagues32 modelled the impact
of movement and animal density on a nationwide
FMD-like disease outbreak in the USA and found that
cattle movement restrictions from infected counties
 | Vet Record

were found to effectively contain outbreaks as compared
with a national moratorium on animal movement. These
findings suggest that animal movements from infected
regions have the capacity to contribute to an outbreak
event and effectively disseminate the virus.

Feral pigs
Feral pigs (Sus scrofa) include released and escaped
domestic pigs, truly wild European boars and their
hybrids, and are believed to have become established in
the continental USA in the 1400s.33–35 Experts estimate
that over 6 million feral pigs roam within at least 35
states in the USA with California, Florida, Oklahoma
and Texas having the largest populations.36 A side-byside experimental infection with FMDV was performed
to compare the clinical manifestation and transmission
capacity of feral and domestic pigs. Domestic and
feral pigs were both found to be highly susceptible to
infection with FMDV and developed similar clinical
signs, although feral pigs had higher tolerance and
the vesicular lesions were more difficult to detect as a
result of their thicker, darker skin.37 This experimental
infection demonstrated that feral pigs are potential
hosts for FMDV due to their acute susceptibility, their
capacity to shed large quantities of virus orally, their
close interactions with domestic livestock, and their
unrestrained, minimally managed lifestyle.
Wildlife species
Along with domestic livestock, wild cloven-hoofed
species are also susceptible to FMDV and the USA is
home to a number of wild ungulates. Experimental
infections have demonstrated susceptibility in whitetailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus),38 39 mule deer
(Odocoileus hemionus),40 elk (Cervus canadensis),41
bison (Bison bison)41 and pronghorn antelope
(Antilocapra americana).42 All of these species show
similar clinical signs as domestic livestock and are
able to transmit the virus to uninfected animals of
the same species and naïve cattle, less elk which
were demonstrated to be more resistant to infection.41
Despite acute susceptibility to FMDV in many wild North
American ungulates, it is unlikely these species would
serve as a true viral reservoir.43 More probably, the
virus would spill over from infected domestic livestock
to susceptible wild ungulates, would be transmitted
through the herd and then would be self-limiting as
the animals became infected and then recovered. This
is supported by historical observations where FMDV
disappears from local wildlife populations following
its eradication in domestic species.43 However,
frequent interactions between infected wildlife and
domestic livestock could result in recurrent spillover
and spillback events which could heavily complicate
virus control. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine
with certainty the role wildlife may or may not play in
a natural setting as there are a number of factors that
Vet RecorD | 

are not accounted for in experimental infections such
as density of each susceptible species on the landscape,
intraspecies interaction, proximity of wildlife species to
one another and to domestic livestock, as well as factors
related to the environment that may affect viral stability
and transmissibility.
Determining population estimates for each wild
cloven-hoofed animal in the USA is a tremendous
undertaking and a national database with this
information is not available. In the event of an outbreak,
state game agencies would have population estimates
for ungulates in that particular region which could be
used to develop a strategy for managing exposed and
infected wildlife.

Emergency preparedness for the USA
The government and private animal sectors of the
USA are acutely aware of the consequences that may
result from the introduction of FMDV and as such, a
variety of foreign animal disease and FMD experts
have assembled documents that address the different
components of an outbreak scenario.44–48 The Red
Book states that a wildlife management plan would
be developed immediately following the identification
of an FMD index case in livestock.46 The density and
distribution of susceptible wildlife species would
be evaluated as well as the social structure, habitat,
contact with livestock and potential duration of viral
exposure as part of a larger wildlife risk assessment.
Additionally, documents providing guidance on
wildlife management in the USA in the event of an FMD
outbreak were developed in 2001 by the International
Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies and by the
USDOI National Park Service in response to the FMD
outbreak in the UK.49 Updating and adding detail to
these guidelines for FMD surveillance and response
in wildlife could be beneficial for future emergency
response operations. Depending on the findings of the
risk assessment, wildlife management principles and
tools would be used to reduce the interaction of wildlife
and livestock and to prevent wildlife from spreading
disease.
Additionally, the North American Foot-and-Mouth
Disease Vaccine Bank at Plum Island Animal Disease
Center maintains an inventory of antigens that are
derived from the virus strains that are currently
circulating globally.50 However, it is not logistically
feasible to maintain an up-to-date vaccine bank with all
the possible FMD serotypes and subtypes on a scale that
would allow for immediate vaccination of all animals
involved in the outbreak or those potentially exposed.
The current vaccines available for FMDV are
inactivated whole virus preparations that are
supplemented with adjuvant.1 These vaccines have
been found to be highly efficacious; however, there are
concerns as their preparation requires the inactivation
of large volumes of live, active virus, and thus a high
3

biocontainment facility. Furthermore, these vaccines are
sometimes contaminated with non-structural proteins
making it difficult to differentiate between vaccinated
and naturally infected animals (also known as DIVA);
however, continued work has led to the development of
more robust DIVA diagnostics.51
Importantly, in 2012 the first FMD vaccine delivered
by replication-defective human adenovirus type 5 vector
(Ad5-FMD) was licensed for use in cattle in the USA in
the event of an outbreak scenario.52 53 This vaccine was
produced as the result of a large public-private enterprise
between the Department of Homeland Security, USDA,
Antelope Valley Biologics and GenVec. The Ad5-FMD
vaccine is engineered to encode structural proteins Vp0,
Vp1 and Vp3 from the A24 Cruzeiro FMDV strain and
contains an adjuvant.52 53 This method is advantageous
for several reasons, including safety which allows the
vaccine to be produced on the US mainland and the
ability to differentiate vaccinated animals from those
naturally infected. However, this new, conditionally
licensed vaccine can only be used for strains that are
heterologous to the A24 Cruzeiro strain.
The Department of Homeland Security is currently
producing master seed viruses for 10 other serotypes
considered to be high and medium-priority strains
by the World Reference Laboratory for Foot-andMouth Disease using the human adenovirus platform.
Limited investments are being made in multivalent and
combinatorial vaccines. The Department of Homeland
Security has also evaluated several other rapid vaccine
platforms for use in an outbreak.
From a diagnostic perspective, both ELISA and
quantitative PCR are highly sensitive and swift
techniques that can be used on samples derived from
any species and allow for the rapid detection of antigen
or amplification of a select region of RNA, respectively.54
Virus isolation methods are used to detect live,
infectious virus which can be subjected to further
assays to determine the exact serotype or subtype of
FMDV, although this method is much slower.55
Despite detailed regulations, extensive documents
outlining proposed control and eradication strategies,
the presence of a variety of FMDV antigens in the
Vaccine Bank and diagnostics that can be used across
a variety of species, an FMD outbreak in the USA may
be difficult to contain. Animal rearing in high-density
settings and routine transportation could facilitate an
FMDV outbreak on a large scale that would likely be
difficult to control and eradicate.

Summary of US vulnerabilities for FMDV introduction or
persistence
Risk of introduction into the USA
FMDV could be introduced into the USA through a
variety of routes. A disease outbreak is most likely to
result from (1) the legal movement of live animals or their
products, by-products or animal feed containing animal
4

products, (2) the illegal movement of live animals and
their products, or (3) an intentional viral release in an
act of bioterrorism. These routes are deemed to be the
most probable means of introduction because of factors
related to infected animal shedding patterns (quantity
and duration), viral stability, historical viral outbreaks
related to the feeding of FMDV-contaminated feed
to susceptible animal species (which has resulted in
several FMDV importations into the USA, including the
1924 outbreak) and current global instability.56 KnightJones and colleagues57 describe risk reduction to be
closely linked to FMD incidence in both neighbouring
and trade countries, highlighting the importance of
regulations surrounding the importation of animals and
their products. They further conclude that unregulated
movement (illegal importation) poses an important
threat of introduction as well.
Legal movement of live animals
Live animal importation serves as a potential route
of introduction because of the acute susceptibility of
a large number of domestic and wild cloven-hoofed
animals and the patterns of viral shedding which
present an opportunity for transmission. Live clovenhoofed animals are not permitted to be imported from
any country that is endemic for FMD; however, this rule
may change owing to concerns that many important,
exotic species in zoos are becoming inbred and new
genes are necessary to revive the US captive population.
Currently, the USA only imports live cloven-hoofed
animals from Mexico, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand, and zoo animals from FMD-free countries (9
CFR Part 93).
During 2015, the Southern and Northern Border
port directors, respectively, report that cattle were the
only cloven-hoofed animals that were imported from
Mexico, and cattle, small ruminants, pigs, bison and
wild animals were the ungulates imported from Canada.
The vast majority of cattle imported from Mexico were
destined for meat production with small numbers
imported for research, competition, breeding or rodeo
use. Cloven-hoofed animals imported from Canada
were destined primarily for breeding and feeding
purposes and direct to slaughter. In addition to Mexico
and Canada, the USA accepts cattle and small ruminant
imports from Australia and New Zealand following
pre-export and post-export quarantines. No cattle or
small ruminants were imported from Australia or New
Zealand in 2015.58
A wide variety of commonly maintained zoo animals
and wildlife species are susceptible to infection with
FMDV, specifically the order Artiodactyla which includes
giraffes, antelopes, sheep, goats, camels and camelids,
and pigs, among others.59 Official zoos tend to adhere
to principles of biosecurity and any unusual clinical
signs or an actual disease outbreak would likely be
readily detected. Furthermore, these facilities typically
 | Vet Record

have a perimeter fence to prevent domestic animals
and native wildlife species from interacting with zoo
animals. However, wildlife reserves, sanctuaries,
parks and high fence properties (which are facilities
with high fences that typically contain animals used
for hunting) often contain both native and non-native
wildlife species that are susceptible to FMDV infection
which are managed much less intensively and may be
rarely, if ever, observed by personnel with expertise in
disease recognition and diagnosis. Moreover, it is likely
that the species confined within the fenced area are
comingled and that they have contact with out-of-fence
wildlife species. In many instances, animals within
these properties are able to escape and become feral
where they certainly could interact with both domestic
livestock and wildlife species.
The process for the movement of captive wild
species across state lines and between facilities
is highly variable because of disparities in state
laws, the species being transported and the
specific regulations associated with both facilities
involved in the transaction. Limited oversight
on many animal rearing facilities may result in
comingling of FMD-susceptible animals that are
both native and exotic, with some potentially being
captive while others are truly wild, and fencing
may be inadequate to prevent accidental escape.
Additionally, in the event of an outbreak scenario
it would be extremely challenging to ascertain the
breadth and magnitude of the role wildlife may play
as both native and non-native species would be a
concern. High fence properties containing exotic
and wild species from abroad often have animals
that escape from this captive setting which could
pose a tremendous threat to native species and
significantly complicate a disease outbreak.60–63
For example, there are a number of breeding
populations of exotic species, such as oryx (Oryx
species), Barbary sheep (Ammotragus lervia) and
nilgai antelope (Boselaphus tragocamelus) in the
USA, especially Texas. Of note, nilgai and oryx are
acutely susceptible to FMDV and develop severe
lesions when infected.64 65 Furthermore, nilgai are
well established in parts of Texas and north-eastern
Mexico and are believed to contribute to the spread
of cattle tick fever across the landscape,66 advancing
the notion that non-native species can complicate
disease transmission patterns. For a thorough
review of FMDV susceptibility in various wildlife
species, see ref 43.
A number of cloven-hoofed animals are imported
into the USA annually 46 and in the event an
FMD-infected animal was imported, the outbreak
potential would be heavily dependent on where
the animal was transported following importation.
Based on simulation modelling, an infected animal
that was imported direct to slaughter would have
Vet RecorD | 

less capacity for disease transmission as compared
with a breeding animal, an animal imported for
competition or rodeo use, or into a feedlot setting. 28–30
Legal movement of animal products, by-products and animal
feed containing animal products
Currently the USA imports a wide variety of animal
products, by-products and animal feed containing
animal products from countries all over the world.
Animal products, by-products and animal feed
containing animal products from FMD-endemic
countries must be mitigated prior to importation using
a mitigation strategy that is approved, such as heat
(at a specific temperature for a specified duration),
pH or chemical treatment. The importation of fresh,
unprocessed animal products, by-products and animal
feed containing animal products from FMD-endemic
countries is strictly prohibited. Imports of this nature
from FMD-free regions typically require a zoo sanitary
certificate attesting to the product identity, country of
origin and that the product has not been exposed to
unauthorised animal products. Of all animal products,
by-products and feed imports, those used to feed
animals are the most important as they represent the
highest risk for FMDV introduction.
Illegal movement of live animals and their products
Illegally imported products and specimens from
domestic livestock may be confiscated by the US
Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border
Protection (CBP). Data provided by CBP depict products
and specimens from domestic livestock and cervids
that were confiscated in the cargo or express courier
environment, which includes both FedEx and DHL,
or via international mail facilities, including the US
postal service. Between calendar years 2012 and 2016,
over 117,000 products and specimens derived from
domestic livestock and cervids were confiscated by CBP.
Pig products made up nearly 60 per cent of all seizures
while bovids, which include cattle, bison, buffalo and
yak, made up approximately 40 per cent; sheep, goats,
cervids and unspecified ruminants each made up
1 per cent or less of all confiscations (figure 1).
The data provided by CBP depict that the continent
of origin for the majority of products and specimens
confiscated by CBP is Asia (~52 per cent), which includes
a number of countries endemic for FMD.67 Africa and
South America, both of which are endemic for FMDV
in some or all regions, were the continent of origin for
a total of 2 per cent of all confiscated products and
specimens. Products and specimens from Europe and
North America comprised approximately 36 per cent
of all confiscations, both of which are FMD free. These
data are summarised in figure 2.
The US Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) is responsible
for the confiscation of illegally imported wildlife and
their products. Data obtained from FWS demonstrated
5

Products from domestic livestock and cervids confiscated
between 2012-2016

Cervids

Bovine

Swine
Sheep
Goats
Unspecified ruminants
Figure 1

A pie chart depicting the types of products confiscated by US Customs and Border Protection between 2012 and 2016 (n=117,308).

that a variety of products were seized between 2006
and 2016, ranging from jewellery to medicinal products
to parts or whole carcasses. For the purpose of the risk
of FMDV introduction into the USA, carcasses, meat,
skin, hooves and bones were included in the data
summary. It is important to note that each confiscation
was treated as a single event (eg, 10 lb of seized meat
was treated identically to 100 lb of seized meat) unless
the measuring unit was a raw number (eg, 10 hides
were counted as 10, not as 1).
The majority of products seized by FWS were those
that originated in other North American countries
(55 per cent), specifically Canada and Mexico. The
African continent was responsible for a quarter of
all cloven-hoofed species product confiscation and

South America, Europe, Asia, Australia and unknown
comprised the remaining 20 per cent. These data
confirm the suspicion that illegal wildlife and wildlife
product importation pose a risk for FMDV introduction
as nearly half of all confiscated products were derived
from continents which are endemic for FMDV (or of
unknown origin).
Notably, over a 10-year period for the entire USA, less
than 2000 wildlife products were confiscated (n=1848).
In contrast, flights arriving at Roissy-Charles de Gaulle
airport in Paris from west and central Africa on a single
carrier (Air France) were estimated to harbour 272
tons of wildlife meat each year.68 While France likely
has more flights originating directly from west and
central African countries than the USA, and while there

Continent of origin for products from domestic livestock and cervids
confiscated between 2012-2016

Unknown

North America
South America
Africa

Europe

Australia

Asia
Figure 2 A pie chart depicting the continent of origin for the products and specimens confiscated by the US Customs and Border Protection between 2012 and 2016
(n=117,308).
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were likely more wildlife seizures than were captured
by the official FWS data, the low number of wildlife
confiscations still suggests that resources for inspection
are likely not sufficient to catch many of the products
entering the USA illegally.
Bioterrorism
Bioterrorism, the intentional release or dissemination
of bacteria, viruses or toxins that cause morbidity or
mortality events in humans, other animals or plants,
presents an alternative route for FMD introduction
into the USA. The breadth of domestic and wildlife
species susceptible to infection, high morbidity, low
infectious dose, high shedding capability of infected
animals, ease of viral collection and crippling economic
impact associated with an introduction makes FMDV a
potential candidate for bioterrorism. This risk provides
an impetus to maintain vigilant surveillance protocols
in both domestic livestock and wildlife species to ensure
rapid detection and differential diagnoses.
Factors that complicate eradication efforts following
introduction
The introduction of FMDV into the USA would be
devastating for both livestock and producers. If the
event was limited to domestic livestock, there is
historical precedent demonstrating that control and
eradication is possible; however, in the event FMDV
was either introduced to feral or wild species or spilled
over from domestic livestock, successful control of the
disease would become more complicated.69
As outlined by Rhyan and Spraker,70 substantial
political, technical and logistical issues arise related
to disease surveillance and control in wildlife. Often,
baseline information on the disease and host population
is lacking and obtaining a reliable population estimate
can be problematic. Passive surveillance activities
are fraught with complication because of reliance on
public reporting, survival behaviours making many
wild species highly stoic and frequent predation and
scavenging of a carcass following the death of an animal.
Active surveillance requires capture or kill techniques
which are both expensive, invasive and, in many cases,
highly controversial. In the event of a disease outbreak,
effective disease containment, efficacious vaccinations
and/or depopulation techniques in a given area can
also present financial and logistical challenges.
Feral pigs
Pigs appear to be quite tolerant to FMDV infection via
inhalation of naturally produced aerosols,71 which
has been substantiated by the demonstration that the
porcine upper respiratory tract is less permissive to viral
inoculation as compared with the upper gastrointestinal
tract.72 However, once infected, pigs shed 30–100 times
more virus from the oropharyngeal tonsil epithelium and
are efficient at spreading FMDV to cattle especially, and
Vet RecorD | 

to a lesser extent, sheep and goats.3 33 73 74 Feral pigs may
serve as a potential host if FMDV was introduced into
the USA.33 75 Their uncontrolled movement could result
in rapid transmission events to domestic livestock and
wildlife species. A study that evaluated the impact of a
FMDV introduction from a wild pig into a commercial
livestock premise in California concluded that FMDV
introduction into a dairy or beef cattle herd could
result in a rapidly spreading outbreak.76 Additionally,
modelling of FMDV transmission in a wild pig-domestic
cattle ecosystem in Australia demonstrated that in
the majority of simulations in which cattle-to-cattle,
cattle-to-pig or pig-to-cattle transmission occurred,
FMDV was able to establish and transmit.77 In this
modelling scenario, FMD was self-limiting in the wild
pigs; however, the most rapid disease control method
targeted both cattle and wild pigs. In the Strandzha
Mountains in Bulgaria, wild boar were found to play
a role, albeit temporally and spatially limited, in the
FMDV transmission cycle.78 79 The magnitude of wild
boar involvement in FMDV transmission is believed
to be heavily dependent on the population size and
density as well as environmental conditions during
viral introduction; however, sylvatic FMD outbreaks in
wild boar and other wild ungulates are likely possible
in parts of Europe, especially in regions with large,
dense populations of FMD-susceptible wildlife. Further
examination of the role of wildlife in the spread of
FMD in Bulgaria determined that limited spread of the
virus is possible in wildlife populations and increased
interaction between domestic and wild animals as
well as increased population densities may lead to
lengthened viral circulation.80 This highlights the need
for robust feral pig population estimates throughout the
USA.
Furthermore, feral pigs have been found to be
translocated and intentionally released by citizens in
an attempt to create local hunting opportunities.33 75
These types of activities would also complicate FMDV
eradication in the event feral pigs became infected and
could facilitate rapid and widespread dissemination
of the virus across the USA. It is important to note that
experimental infections in both domestic and feral pigs
suggest that pigs are unlikely to be competent longterm carriers of infectious FMDV.37 81 However, feral pigs
could become infected and significantly complicate
disease control efforts in domestic livestock via spillover
and spillback events.
Wildlife species
Experimental infections have demonstrated the
susceptibility of a number of wild cloven-hoofed species
in the USA; however, multiple other species of clovenhoofed animals are native to the USA, such as moose
(Alces alces), bighorn sheep (Ovis canadensis), mountain
goats (Oreamnos americanus), and caribou (Rangifer
tarandus) and muskoxen (Ovibus moschatus) in Alaska.
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These species are likely to be susceptible to FMDV to
varying degrees, although no experimental work has
been conducted. While experimental challenges are
useful for understanding host-pathogen dynamics,
they fail to provide other crucial epidemiological
information relative to interactions between the host,
pathogen and environment. Furthermore, wildlife
density on the landscape both independent of, and in
relation to, domestic livestock is fundamental in order
to gain a full understanding of the dynamic. In addition,
zoos, wildlife parks and high fence properties (many in
Texas) often contain multipleFMDV susceptible species.
Aside from African Cape buffalo, no other wildlife
species has been shown to play an important role in the
maintenance of FMDV, despite all seven FMDV serotypes
having been found in wildlife.43 Clinical disease
associated with FMDV infection in wildlife species
ranges from asymptomatic to lethal infections, with
the majority of gross and histopathological lesions
resembling those seen in domestic species. Usually
outbreaks in wildlife are resultant from passive
spillover events from domestic livestock, and despite
decades of research, no evidence exists to suggest that
wildlife species serve as a true reservoir (except for Cape
buffalo).
Most FMD outbreaks in wildlife are resultant from
passive spillover events from domestic livestock,
including in 1924 when there was an FMDV outbreak
in cattle that spilled over into the mule deer population
in California, resulting in the culling of 22,000 deer,
10 per cent of which exhibited typical FMDV lesions.82
Rapid culling of both cattle and deer resulted in viral
eradication from both domestic and wild species soon
thereafter. Furthermore, a model simulating FMDV
spread in Texas found that both deer and feral pigs may
amplify virus and contribute to viral maintenance.83
These findings contradict other available literature
stating that wildlife species are, for the most part, not
true reservoirs; however, pathogen transmission is
heavily dependent on the location(s) of introduction,
density of susceptible animals, types of animals infected
and shedding infectious virus, proximity of infected
and naïve animals and many other factors, suggesting
that the possibility of short-term FMD maintenance in
wildlife populations exists.

Discussion and concluding remarks
Due to the breadth of species that are susceptible to
FMDV infection and the large number of countries
with endemic disease, an introduction of FMDV, either
accidental or purposeful, presents a threat to the USA.
Furthermore, re-establishing FMD-free status following
an introduction would be substantially more complex
if the virus spills over (or is introduced) to feral pigs
or wildlife species. Many regulations and systems are
in place to prevent the importation of FMDV while
importing animals and their products via legal channels.
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The illegal importation of animals and their products,
both wild and domestic species, as well as bioterrorism
is difficult to control, manage or regulate without
substantial investment in personnel and resources and
represents a risk for FMDV importation and subsequent
introduction.
Future directions and recommendations
FMDV introduction in feral pigs and/or wildlife species
would heavily complicate eradication.70 One potential
way to address FMD introduction in wildlife would be
to use existing hunter check station infrastructure to
build a means of surveilling wildlife for FMD. Hunter
check stations are typically administered at the state
level and were established and maintained primarily
for regulatory and population management data. Some
are currently used to evaluate deer for chronic wasting
disease, bovine tuberculosis and other pathogens,
but also serve to provide population information to
wildlife management agencies. In the event of an FMDV
introduction or if spillover into deer was of heightened
concern, guidelines could be developed to incorporate
surveillance for FMD into hunter check stations. Hunter
check stations could be used over broad areas, but if more
targeted wildlife surveillance was required, the USDA/
APHIS/Wildlife Services (WS)/National Wildlife Disease
Program (NWDP) has trained biologists and emergency
first responders that could target surveillance efforts to
specific areas in a coordinated effort with a domestic
animal outbreak response. Field biologists working
with wildlife and feral pigs could be further trained to
identify clinical signs of FMDV and examine trapped
or euthanised wildlife and feral pigs for the presence
of vesicular lesions. In the event an animal is observed
with such lesions, further differential diagnostics could
be taken to determine aetiology.
Zoos as well as animal parks, sanctuaries and
wildlife reserves, as well as other operations, often
maintain FMD-susceptible species which could further
complicate eradication methods in the event of an
outbreak. Depending on the type of operation, there
is often very little oversight on the types and numbers
of animals maintained, and in some cases these exotic
species escape and establish reproductively active
populations outside of captivity. The role that exotic
wildlife would play in FMD transmission and
maintenance given a viral introduction is unknown;
however, control strategies would certainly be further
complicated. Enhanced databases that maintain what
types of animals are kept and the numbers maintained,
for both domestic livestock and exotic species, would
be useful to evaluate risk and inform control strategies.
Despite its utility, there are significant privacy concerns
that may necessitate the use of non-traditional
approaches. For example, a spatial microsimulation
model was created using domestic pig farms which
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attempts to balance privacy concerns with the need for
robust data.84
Most data suggest that FMD will ultimately be selflimiting in wildlife and that effective control of FMDV
in domestic livestock will result in sufficient protection
for both livestock and wildlife species without
necessitating intervention on the wildlife side.43 FMD
would likely also be self-limiting in feral pigs based
on the data from FMD-infected wild boar abroad79;
however, these animals do pose a unique problem
because of their gregarious nature, large litter size and
abundant geographical distribution, in addition to their
susceptibility to FMDV and robust shedding patterns
following infection. Additionally, they have been shown
to interact freely with domestic pigs in some situations35
and likely other domestic livestock. The current USDA/
APHIS/Feral Swine Damage Management Program
is designed to reduce damage associated with feral
pigs through a variety of means, including removal.
Disease surveillance programmes, including the USDA/
APHIS/WS/NWDP, are in place for several pathogens
that pose a risk to humans, domestic livestock and
wildlife; however, the programme could include FMD
surveillance in feral pigs in the event of an introduction
or outbreak.
Active wildlife surveillance could potentially
incorporate
thermography
to
evaluate
hoof
temperature40 or baited cotton ropes that could
be evaluated for the presence of live or dead virus
in saliva.85 86 Rope-in-a-bait sampling has been
experimentally evaluated using laboratory inoculated
wild boar and comparisons between the baited rope and
direct swabbing were found to have similar sensitivity.87
An additional non-invasive screening method is aerosol
sampling which has been shown to be an effective
means of detecting FMDV in expired air from several
species of domestic livestock.88 89 Virus detection from
airway sampling preceded clinical disease in most
cases which makes it a particularly useful tool for early
detection.89 Thermography, baited rope and aerosol
sampling are all non-invasive techniques and could be
used in conjunction with other surveillance methods.
Studies on using baited cotton ropes for wildlife
FMDV surveillance could identify robust and efficient
methodologies in diagnostic testing and experimental
designs for their use on the landscape. Depending on
terrain and climate it is likely that variation will exist
for optimal placement in different geographical regions
and with differing wildlife densities and these need to
be elucidated prior to use. Aerosol sampling in wildlife
would present significant challenges as individual
animals would need to be caught and restrained;
however, it may be a favourable surveillance method,
especially with endangered or charismatic wildlife
species.
Despite the presence of an FMD vaccine bank and a
conditionally licensed product in the USA in the event of
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an outbreak, the use of vaccines is quite controversial. As
per the OIE guidelines, the return to free status following
an outbreak of FMD requires substantial oversight and
is a lengthy process,90 which is exacerbated by the
use of vaccines. Administering vaccines necessitates
significant resources and infrastructure aside from
having sufficient vaccine quantities that can be
delivered quickly, including regulatory framework;
animal identification and tracking systems; and
surveillance and control measures such as biosecurity,
cleaning and disinfection protocols. Furthermore, the
interface between state and federal agencies as well as
private animal owners is quite complex and potentially
reflects competing interests. The determination of
vaccine efficacy in wildlife species may be important in
the event the virus was to be introduced or spilled over,
especially if large, charismatic or endangered species
were involved. To date, FMD vaccines have not been
evaluated in any wildlife species.
The USA (and other FMD-free countries) have
operated under a ‘stamping out’ protocol following the
introduction of FMDV which involves mass depopulation
of infected and potentially exposed animals. This
method has been adopted due, in part, to the inability
of the current vaccines to prevent primary infection,91 92
difficulty with viral persistence92 93 and because of the
implications vaccine usage has on international trade of
domestic animal products.94 Stamping out is considered
to be highly efficacious when the virus is in a somewhat
focal region and restricted to domestic species or a small
number of wildlife (eg, 1924 outbreak in California).95
However, stamping out becomes complicated if the virus
is widespread, infects a large number of animals, or
feral pigs and/or wildlife are heavily involved for several
reasons: (1) cost, (2) environmental damage associated
with the disposal of a huge number of carcasses, (3)
inability to find and remove all infected animals, (4)
valuable genetics, especially for native wildlife species
and zoo animals, and (5) public perception associated
with large-scale removal of charismatic wildlife species.
Therefore, avoiding widespread infection in wildlife is
key. This could be accomplished, in part, by having
a clear strategy for vigilant surveillance in wildlife,
combined with continued training for field personnel
in differential diagnosis of vesicular diseases and
validated diagnostics for wildlife.
In summary, our review of the literature related
to FMDV infection in wildlife species in the USA has
generated a number of recommendations that would
be useful in an outbreak scenario and to better control
and eradicate the virus in the event it spilled into wild
or feral animals. Databases containing information
about the types and numbers of cloven-hoofed animals
maintained at each property, including both domestic
livestock and exotic wildlife imported for sport or
pleasure, are essential for rapidly assessing risk or
mobilising control efforts following an outbreak.
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The development of non-invasive surveillance
methods, such as baited ropes, aerosol sampling and
thermography, is important as traditional sampling
methods for wild and feral species are both labour and
cost intensive which minimises its utility. Studying
vaccine efficacy in susceptible US wildlife species,
such as mule and white-tailed deer, bison, pronghorn
antelope and a number of zoo animals, may be a useful
research endeavour in the event of a national outbreak
scenario in which a stamping out approach would be
infeasible. Additionally, characterising and validating
PCR methods in wildlife would be crucial to the
development of robust diagnostics.
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